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Abstract
This article aims to determine and analyse the main features of channels of 
financial contagion in the banking sector of the Baltic States. The most relevant channels 
seem to be the risk of common lender, the channel of real estate prices, the channel of 
other macroeconomic shocks and the channel of volatility. This paper contributes to the 
further analysis of internal and external causes of financial crisis and its transmission 
channels in the banking sector of the Baltic States.
Purpose – to indicate and explain the main problems related to the systemic risk 
and the channels of financial contagion in the banking sector of the Baltic States.
Design/methodology/approach – general overview of research papers presenting 
concepts and methodologies of assessment of systemic risk of the banking sector, statistical 
analysis of financial data.
Findings – determination of the main channels and extent of financial contagion 
relevant to the banking sector of the Baltic States.
Research limitations/implications – the lack of information concerning the 
liquidity and asset structure of the banking sector of the Baltic States and the real estate 
prices in the Baltic States. The most common problem analysing the financial contagion 
and systemic risk is the lack of information (especially about the structure of liabilities and 
assets of financial institutions, its maturity) and the changing new banking regulatory 
conditions. Due to the lack of data it is impossible to create stable and reliable statistical 
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models describing the stochastic behaviour of financial contagion. We do not take into 
account the political factors concerning the reforms of financial market supervision that 
also impact financial contagion and systemic risk ant the attitude of foreign investors 
towards the Baltic States. The findings of this article should ground the macro-prudential 
policy in the small countries of supervising institutions focussing on the external factors.
Practical implications – identification of the channels of external and internal 
negative shocks to the banking sector of the Baltic States; useful not only for the banking 
executives providing business trends and officers of supervising institutions that should 
use not only Basel III requirements, identifying potential sources of risk in the near 
future, but for the rest part of the society, both ordinary citizens and entrepreneurs 
having current accounts and deposits in banks.
Originality/Value – modelling of systemic risk and analysis of instability causes of 
the banking sector by applying reliable quantitative methods in Lithuania is insufficiently 
developed and is impossible without knowing the mechanisms of transitions of external 
and internal shocks on banking sector. Researchers have provided an exhaustive analysis 
of contagion and channels of contagion in global extent or in another cases and regions. 
The banking sectors of the Baltic States are essentially controlled by the same foreign 
banking groups and the liquidity problems faced by international financial groups could 
therefore spill over into the other banks in the Baltic States. This case is not exhaustively 
analysed by other researchers. This paper is one of the first attempts to describe and 
make a quantitative assessment of the financial contagion in the Baltic States. Large 
dependence of the banking institutions in the Baltic States on their investors means not 
only the simple attraction of capital flows but additional risk that can arise due to the 
lack of liquidity or panics of patronising financial institutions. The findings of this article 
should ground macro-prudential policy focussing on the external factors.
Keywords: interbank market, systemic risk, channels of financial contagion.
Research type: literature review, general review.
1. Introduction
Many banking crises have occurred in conjunction with cyclical downturns 
or other aggregate shocks of economy and finance markets, such as interest rate 
increases, equity market crashes or exchange rate devaluations, and they often are 
transmitted from one region or country to another. Systemic risk in the Baltic States 
can be treated as the respective level of sensitivity of investment portfolio on internal 
and external factors. Increased sensitivity of individual banks to shocks due to higher 
leverage or greater reliance on short-term funding does not imply a higher probability 
that some financial institutions will default at the same time, i.e., increased systemic 
risk. Banking sectors of the Baltic States are similar, significantly concentrated and can 
be divided into several categories: large banks, medium banks and small banks.
There are many different definitions of financial contagion (see, for example, 
Pericoli and Sbracia, 2001). Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz define contagion as the 
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probability that a crisis in a country at a point in time is correlated with the occurrence 
of a crisis in other countries, after controlling for the effects of political and economic 
fundamentals (for more details, see Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz, 1996).
In the extent of the local banking sector, financial contagion is defined as 
transmission of idiosyncratic shocks from one bank (or a group of banks) to other 
financial institutions. In this case contagion is distinguished from common shocks 
affecting all banks simultaneously (references). In the regional or international 
terms the financial contagion can be treated as transmission of financial shocks from 
one country to another. A common shock can be treated as the main cause of the 
simultaneous occurrence of a crisis across countries. In addition, financial contagion 
is defined as the co‐movements between financial markets during the crisis after 
eliminating the common shock impact (see Fang and Yafeng, 2013). Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) interpret financial contagion as a significant increase in cross‐market 
linkages after a shock to a country, or a group of countries. Their paper suggests that 
rather than contagion existing only during the crisis period, there is strong long-
term interdependence between markets. At the same time, Bekaert et al. (2005) 
define contagion as the excess correlation over and above what one would expect on 
economic fundamentals. Of course, the concept of financial contagion is developing 
and generalised further (for example, see Carletti, Hartmann, 2002, ECB, 2010).
To study financial stability, it is important to investigate how interdependencies 
across different banking systems and markets are potentially more important for 
financial stability than interdependencies within the system, since these links can 
change the behaviour of market participants (see, for example, Ghorbel, Abdelwahed, 
2013). During the financial crisis the behaviour of a player active in different systems 
might be affected not only by a shock, but by interdependencies among the systems 
in which it operates. As a consequence, the same player will behave differently in each 
system, even if it faces no liquidity hoarding or other strategic motivation (for more 
details see ECB investigation, 2010).
Despite the fact that the Baltic States are a periphery area of financial markets, and 
the extent of the impact of the global financial crisis is moderate due to the conservative 
credit policy of financial institutions, there exist other channels of contagion. The 
systemic risk in the banking sector of the Baltic States to a large extent is a consequence 
of its dependence on external capital. Despite the fact that situation of Nordic banks 
is stable and well capitalised, this risk is increased by the fact that the majority of 
the Baltic banking sector is controlled by the same financial institutions operating 
in the Nordic countries. Financial interlinkages between financial institutions can be 
classified according to some types. The contagion of common lender corresponds to 
this type.
This article aims to determine and analyse the main features of channels of 
financial contagion in the banking sector of the Baltic States. Although the structure 
of the banking sector and its assets is quite simple and evident, there are few scientific 
assessments of systemic risk. At the same time, the region of the Baltic States is very 
sensitive to external economic shocks and this fact requires additional solutions for 
the assessment and management of systemic risk.
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2. Overview of the main contagion channels in the Baltic States 
from one country to another
In recent years, when viewed systemically, all banking sectors in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania are approximately relevant. Therefore, the initial source of liquidity 
or solvency (default) risk from patronised financial institutions in any of the Baltic 
States has approximately the same impact on other banking sectors through common 
creditor channel. In addition, although the probability that the five patronising 
financial institutions from the Nordic countries representing the common creditor 
for the Baltic States will simultaneously withdraw their investments during the 
crisis period is very small, such risk still exists. In addition, there are several external 
transmission mechanisms.
Default risk and liquidity risk of patronising financial institutions. Modern 
financial institutions dependent on short-term financing via money markets face a run 
from short-term lenders who may decide to withdraw their funding, for example due 
to their own future needs of liquidity or because their own assessment of counterparty 
risk. Moreover, if a financial institution is still able to obtain funding of its less liquid 
assets, such funding causes the risk of increasing difference between the book value 
of the asset and the funding obtained when using it as collateral. In addition, banks 
may face large liquidity demands. At the same time, when an illiquid portfolio of a 
defaulted bank is sold on the market, the price feedback can impact on the portfolios of 
other financial institutions holding similar assets. This type of feedback can be treated 
as a shock that fragilises the capitalisation of the whole financial system. In addition, 
when the capital position (especially Tier-1 capital) of a bank no longer can withstand 
losses, it becomes insolvent, and its counterparties, with their already fragile capital 
positions, write off their exposures to the defaulted bank and in turn they may become 
insolvent, leading to a potential cascade of defaults (for more details, see Amini and 
Minca, 2009). Since the largest commercial banks in the Baltic States are the net 
debtors of foreign patronising banks and are not systemically relevant debtors in the 
local interbank markets, i.e. unlike in the developed interbank markets in Europe, 
they are not necessarily the main source of credit contagion (see Valužis and Židulina, 
2010). Then again, the default risk and cascade of bank run is closely related to the 
concentration of the banking sector. That is evident in the Baltic States. However, the 
impact of increased concentration on the interbank markets stability is unclear.
Propagation of default can be modelled via domino effects using network and 
simulation approaches (see, for example, Gudelytė and Navickienė, 2013): a shock 
(which may be a liquidity shock or a loss in the value of total assets) affecting balance 
sheets and default of one or few institutions will propagate due to interconnectedness 
to neighbouring institutions and may possibly affect an important fraction of the 
financial system. Since the local interbank markets in separate Baltic States consist of a 
small number of credit institutions, it is reasonable to assume that they have direct links 
with each other, i.e. interbank markets in the Baltic States are complete. This means 
that each credit institution holds a portfolio of positions with all the remaining banks 
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in the interaction-based market and that the credit institutions have the same number 
of partners (linkages) on the interbank market. In the current situation and during the 
period until now there was no counterparty risk from the side of patronising banks of 
the Nordic countries. In other words, the default of any patronising banks from the 
Nordic countries will not induce the default of patronising banks in the Baltic States 
despite the fact that banking sectors here are strongly concentrated with systemically 
relevant money supply centres.
There are also some other financial institutions residing in one of the Baltic States 
which also have their subsidiaries in other Baltic States. The last example of correlated 
defaults was the collapse of Snoras financial group.
Risk of common creditor. The systemic risk due to common lender means 
that some countries or regions depending on a common creditor are vulnerable to 
spillovers through this linkage. These spillovers result from financial interlinkages 
between the affected countries. The underlying presumption is that common creditor 
exposures in the Baltic States affected by the primary financial crisis is relatively large, 
implying substantial potential losses, and hence the need to restore capital asset ratios, 
or readjust risk exposures, accounting for the common bank lender effect. Usually 
spillovers through financial market interlinkages emerge from shifts in investor 
portfolios. The common creditor channel presupposes that financial institutions’ 
responses to unexpected losses are fairly mechanistic (see Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 
2000). Therefore, the needs of patronising financial institutions to rebalance their 
portfolios following losses in the primary crisis country (not necessarily in the Baltic 
States) leads to an instantaneous reduction of lending to other countries in which they 
hold exposures even if the situation in those financial markets is stable. In addition, 
the risk of short-term liquidity remains even if the owning financial institution should 
not give any more credit.
The banking sector in each of the Baltic States has one or more lending centres. 
These lending centres can cause cross-border spillovers in several ways (for more 
details, see Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2000). Losses in one country could lead 
the banks to sell off assets in other countries for the sake of restoring their capital 
adequacy ratios. Problems in the financial system of the Baltic States can occur just 
due to the sudden liquidity shortage in patronising financial institutions and in the 
Nordic interbank markets. Therefore, the Baltic banking sector strongly depends 
on the monetary policy of Nordic central banks, the state of interbank markets and 
supervision of patronising financial institutions.
Nordic banks are major sources of financing for the banking sector of the Baltic 
States and also one of the most volatile ones. One of the most important channels of 
financial contagion is the fact that the main financial institutions in the Baltic States 
are owned by the same shareholders from the Nordic countries. Despite the fact that 
the majority of the banking sector in the Baltic States is financed by the capital of the 
Nordic banks and therefore they are not the source of credit risk, there is the risk 
of financial contagion via possible shortage of liquidity and panics of patronising 
financial institutions due to their point of view towards local economic policy and 
other problems in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The problem in 
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patronised institutions’ banking in the Baltic States can occur only due to sudden 
liquidity shortage in patronising financial institutions and liquidity shortage in 
interbank markets of the Nordic countries. Therefore, the Baltic banking sector 
strongly depends on the monetary policy, the situation in interbank markets, and 
supervision of financial institutions in the Nordic countries.
Channel of currency crisis. Another channel of financial contagion is the one of 
currency crises since Denmark, Norway and Sweden are outside the euro area, and the 
problem of sensitivity to exchange rates and its fluctuations remains. Therefore, there is 
a currency-based volatility and risk of sudden jumps in exchange rates, and they must 
be hedged in investor portfolios. The exchange rate regime is often the cornerstone 
of macroeconomic stabilisation programmes in emerging markets. In addition, the 
history of the Baltic States demonstrates that in small and open economies a fixed 
exchange rate target may be an effective nominal anchor to domestic prices and wages. 
The quest for an external anchor may turn out to be a difficult task, as shown by the 
collapse of several traditional fixed or crawling peg arrangements during 1990s. In 
particular, economists have focused on the ability of a given exchange rate regime to 
face potentially contagious financial crises, which seem to be an inevitable collateral 
inconvenience of integrated financial markets (see Habib 2002).
Investor expectations that the Lithuanian and Latvian foreign exchange rate 
regimes will collapse did not materialise. Of course, it would have happened in Latvia, 
if the IMF had not given the required volume of loans. However, the Lithuanian 
case demonstrated the ability to maintain adequate state of fixed exchange rate, even 
under pressure on the part of financial market participants. It is clear that the financial 
situation of banks was largely dependent on the implemented governmental policies 
and actions of the ECB and further emerging market participants’ expectations.
Channel of sovereign debt contagion. Besides the contagious effects within 
the banking sector, there are the links between banking and sovereign debt that also 
forms an important part of systemic risk. A sovereign default may even limit the 
banks’ capacity of originating investment to its own, initial wealth, thereby unfolding 
an adverse impact on the real economy. The analysis of links between banking and 
sovereign debt dominate recent research of systemic risk (see, for example, Manasse 
and Zavaloni, 2013). Bolton and Jeanne (2011) analyse the impact of government 
bonds as a collateral on the interbank lending market. Assuming that a fraction of 
banks receive an investment opportunity, sovereign risks hamper the bank’s capacity 
to use government bonds as collateral in their balance sheets. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) 
and Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2012) extend this analysis in the case of multiple 
countries. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) show that banks in each country diversify their 
bond holdings by creating risk diversification ex ante but risks of financial contagion 
ex post. At the same time, Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2012) relate the strength of 
financial institutions to cross-country capital flows and the governmental decision 
to default and conclude that better financial institutions increase capital inflows to a 
country and reduce the government solvency risk. Conversely, Acharya, Drechsler, 
and Schnabl (2011) discuss the impact of banking crisis and government bailouts on 
the sovereign debt risk. The main insight of this research is the two-way feedback 
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between the solvency of the financial sector on one hand and the public sector on the 
other.
In fact, the crisis in the euro area means the crisis of sovereign debt and bad fiscal 
policy during the previous period in PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) 
countries, but not the collapse of the currency framework itself.
Following the data on public finance, the majority of domestic sovereign debt 
of the Baltic States is owned by the local banking sector but the substantial part of 
the whole sovereign debt is owned by foreign investors. Consequently, these financial 
institutions have the opportunity to earn an additional return on the financial crisis 
due to increased risk premia. At the same time, the sovereign credit rating downgrade 
affects the quality of sovereign debt securities as collateral for loans in the interbank 
markets. Another problem that can occur in small markets relates to lack of confidence, 
lack of investors and the low level of liquidity in the secondary market for sovereign 
debt securities during the financial crisis.
Estonia has not caused any major problems with sovereign debt, so that the 
channel had no significant effect on the country’s banking sector systemic risk. In fact, 
Latvia went bankrupt, and only the outer IMF assistance has enabled this country to 
stabilise the situation. Although a sizeable proportion of the public debt of the IMF 
has returned to the external creditor leveraged on favourable terms, the intervention 
was necessary to remedy the situation. Of course, the banking sector has experienced 
this effect on a huge pressure because the market during the period was dominated by 
government securities high risk premia. The situation of Lithuania was similar, but the 
Government chose to act in another way. Foreign investors had very little confidence 
in state facilities to repay its loans and therefore borrowed only for short time. For this 
reason, a significant increase in the risk premium made it difficult for local banks to 
finance their activities. Of course, these conditions resulted in extremely tight credit 
policy in the Baltic States in 2009-2011.
Impact of macroeconomic factors and the structure of the economies. There 
are many channels through which macroeconomic and financial linkages can arise. 
It is clear that deterioration of external financial conditions may affect the economy 
through negative impact on consumption and investment decisions, or through 
credit rationing, given the difficulty to identify solvent borrowers and therefore to 
stress the banking conditions in local markets. In addition, an economic downturn 
may negatively affect the valuation of financial assets, since the present value of their 
generated future cash flows decreases. The total impact on the economy depends not 
only on agent behaviour but also on the institutional framework they operate in, both 
of which vary across countries and over time (for more details, see Ciccarelli et al., 
2013). These authors analysed the evolution and heterogeneity in macro-financial 
linkages and international spillovers over the last three decades for some developed 
economies in a unified framework. Country-specific factors remain important, and 
they explain the heterogeneous behaviour of agents across countries. Spillovers are 
found to matter in macroeconomic-financial linkages: a negative shock to a real or 
financial variable in a given country affects all other economies, despite the fact that the 
transmission is only partial. These international spillovers seem to be faster and deeper 
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between financial variables than between real variables (see Ciccarelli et al., 2013). In 
addition, these authors showed empirically that all recessions have a common and an 
idiosyncratic component. In the Baltic States, international trade between the Baltic 
States is quite intensive, mostly based on long-term but unstable collaboration, and 
in general, the real-sector companies use the same financial services from the same 
dominating banks.
Despite the fact that the structure of economy is quite different within the Baltic 
States (e.g. different structure of exports), the common macro-economic trends 
occurring in this region (as inflation, lagged business cycles, development of real estate 
prices, etc.), impact the banking sectors of these countries. As in other small countries, 
the main part of macroeconomic channel is composed from the sensitivity of the 
Baltic States’ economies to sudden changes of external conditions since, unlike local 
consumption, the export forms a very relevant fraction of GDP. In addition, many 
banks, even the prudent ones, cannot be protected against macroeconomic shocks 
better than the imprudent ones. The default models and information contagion can be 
applied to explain the resilience of a separate financial institution to macroeconomic 
shocks. As in other cases, banks in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are vulnerable 
to macroeconomic shocks and downplay the scope for contagion. For example, 
fluctuations of interest rates may largely impact present values of bank exposures. 
There is, however, the efficient allocation of interest rate risk induced by technology 
shocks. This paradigm was proposed by Hellwig (for more detail, see Hellwig, 1998) 
who showed that fraction of interest rate allocation should also be borne by early 
withdrawing depositors.
It is reasonable that a negative shock in one market transmits itself to the other 
markets, as investors adjust their portfolio allocations (see Cipriani et al., 2013). The 
change of interest rates, foreign financial capital flows, internal trade conditions, fiscal 
policy decisions and other structural factors on recent cyclical economic movements 
have a strong impact on the portfolio quality and balance-sheets of financial institutions.
Channel of equity market contagion. A common approach to testing for 
contagion is based on the analysis of correlation coefficients across asset returns. If 
the correlation in returns between assets in separate markets increases significantly 
during a crisis, this can be treated as evidence of contagion. At the same time, illiquid 
and shallow local equity market in the Baltic States serves as a buffer on contagion 
from other regions.
Channel of real estate contagion. It is evident that boom and bust cycles in real 
estate markets are one of the most important or even primary causes of financial crises 
(see Allen and Carletti, 2013). In “boom and bust times” speculators find it profitable 
to borrow from banks and enter the real estate market. Thus, due to the lack of macro-
prudential policy the result is a bubble in real estate prices in that they are higher 
than the discounted stream of housing services during the boom phase. Of course, it 
impacts the managers of patronising financial institutions and may inspire them to 
re-balance their portfolio of mortgage loans in other countries.
Real estate prices in virtually all of the Baltic States follow the same trend. Their 
importance to the quality of the loan portfolio is significant and because they can lead 
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to the corresponding financial decisions of managers Then again, real estate is one 
of the main loan collaterals. Therefore unfavourable real estate market trends have 
a negative impact on the quality of credit institutions’ loan portfolio.. It is proved 
empirically that easy credit conditions and active expansion contributed moderately 
to real economic growth but significantly added to overheating pressures by pushing 
up real estate prices, encouraging concentration of labour and capital into procyclical 
sectors and increasing private sector debt burden (see Ramanauskas, 2011; Hoesli and 
Reka, 2013).
Although mortgage lending in the Baltic countries has shrunk considerably, 
any price changes will have a negative impact on the Nordic banks that are the main 
creditors of the Baltic States’ real estate and real economy sectors.
Channel of social learning and psychological factors. Social learning channel 
arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of 
agents in foreign markets (for more details, see Trevino, 2013). The problem of 
bank run due to withdrawals is solved partially by the insurance systems of deposits. 
However, the liabilities of the system of deposit insurance are not adequate to the extent 
economy and structure of the financial markets in the Baltic States. The information-
based bank run is possible because the customers in this region have “long memory” 
of bank crashes during the period from 1990s.
Channel of volatility contagion. Volatility contagion means the uncertainty 
arising from pessimistic expectations of investors as to the country risk under new 
global economic conditions. This external influence is generally defined as volatility 
contagion or volatility spillover (for more details, see Habib, 2002). While the empirical 
literature has investigated the volatility contagion hypothesis in stock markets, much 
less attention has been devoted to the propagation of interest rate and exchange rate 
volatility across different countries. Habib shows the impact of the volatility of external 
factors on financial markets by testing the hypothesis of “volatility contagion”. The 
presence of emerging-market ‘volatility contagion’ might be an explanation of this 
result. It is complicated to measure the volatility contagion, nonetheless it means the 
banks’ uncertainty in fixed income markets and also the impact of liquidity shortage 
or its expectation in near future. 
Interdependence between different channels of contagion. Volatility contagion 
has a strong impact on the behaviour of agents and psychological factors that impact 
financial decisions. At the same time, several macro-economic factors also strongly 
impact the level of interest rates and its volatility. It is hard to measure the “total“ 
volatility that arises from this one in fixed income markets and in stock and real estate 
markets. All these uncertainties together with information asymmetry can potentially 
encourage the panics of depositors and additional stress for the banking sector.
3. The structure of bank assets and financial contagion risk
The activity of the banking sector in the Baltic States is quite conservative. The 
most part of banking investment consists of loans. The derivatives are not popular 
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and relevant in the portfolio of financial institutions of the Baltic States. However, 
depending on the exact structure of the interbank deposit market and the liquidation 
value of the bank’s assets, the crisis of a single institution may spread over to other 
banks and become systemic.
It has been recognised that large portfolios of individual risks, such as mortgages, 
credit default swaps, or life insurance contracts, cannot be fully diversified due to 
the dependence between individual risks, which arises from exposure to common 
exogenous risk factors, called systematic risk, but also from contagion phenomena 
(see Gagliardini and Gouriéroux, 2011). At the same time, collateralised loans are 
quite conservative financial instruments, and the main source of risk is the credit risk 
resulting from individual insolvency and possibly from the change of macroeconomic 
conditions. Therefore, the impact of financial contagion through international 
channels is limited.
Classical loans dominate the structure of bank assets. In addition, the fraction 
of derivatives is  an irrelevant part of banks assets in the Baltic States. In contrast, the 
provisions following financial stability information still remain at high level. At the 
same time, the largest part of banking activity financing is based on short-term loans 
and it is therefore very sensitive to the changes of interest rates and liquidity situation 
in money markets 
Despite these facts, the main problem of the portfolios in the Baltic States consists 
of the limited possibilities to diversify its risks, because the local markets are shallow. 
At the same time, the quality of collateral is moderate.
Interbank markets. Lending between banks in the Baltic interbank markets is 
mainly based on collateralised loans and the remaining part of interbank lending 
without collateral is not systemically relevant. However, collateralised loans in 
interbank markets satisfy the liquidity needs for separate banks and often only reduce 
but not eliminate credit risk and systemic risk.
4. Conclusions
We explained and distinguished more strictly the notions of financial contagion 
and correlated defaults. We have also presented the structure of the local interbank 
markets as the source and channel of financial contagion through interbank linkages. 
In addition, we treated the risk of common creditor channel as a specific channel 
of financial contagion in the Baltic region not only due to the crisis in a particular 
country but also due to the shortage of liquidity of foreign financial institutions. The 
Baltic banking sector strongly depends on the monetary policy of the Nordic central 
banks, the state of interbank markets and the supervision of patronising financial 
institutions. The contagion effects of the failure of a smaller bank are limited.
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